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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Z.P., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

B193688
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. CK25538)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DOROTHY L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
Jacqueline Lewis, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

Amir Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Dorothy L. (Mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile dependency court terminating its jurisdiction over her son, Z. Mother argues that she was not provided with reasonable reunification services; the court should not have terminated jurisdiction because continuing supervision was necessary; and the court's visitation order was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

FACTS

This is Mother's second appeal in this case. Her prior appeal was decided earlier this year, *In re Z.P.* (Jan. 19, 2007, B188930) (nonpub. opn.). In her first appeal, Mother contested the dependency court's jurisdictional findings. Now, she has taken precisely the opposite tack and is challenging the court's termination of dependency jurisdiction. We show the background leading up to the current appeal by reciting the facts from our opinion in case No. B188930.

Z., born in 1992, first came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in 1996, when he was detained from Mother. Mother was accused of keeping an unsanitary home and substance abuse, and Z. was suffering from anxiety and depression. The petition was later dismissed.

In January 2005, Mother contacted DCFS and asked that Z. be placed in foster care because she was "having a psychological breakdown" and lacked the emotional and financial means to care for her son. Mother expressed fear of Z.'s father Z.P. (Father), whom she accused of stalking, alcoholism, making terrorist threats, and failing to pay child support. When interviewed, Z. indicated that Mother "is feeling stressed," but he felt safe and wished to remain in her care. Z. expressed distaste for Father. Z. was not receiving the psychological counseling that was previously ordered by the family law court. Z.'s school counselor reported that parental conflict caused Z. to be stressed and upset, and interfered with his schooling.

A family preservation meeting was conducted in February 2005. During the family preservation meeting, the participants discussed familial problems, particularly Z.'s need for therapy, his depression, the effect of parental discord on him, his need to feel psychological and physical safety, and so on. Mother continually tried to raise

accusations against Father, despite repeated admonishments that the meeting was not about blaming others. Mother did not concentrate on the issue at hand, i.e., moving forward. Because the parents were unable to resolve any issues at the family preservation meeting and there were grave concerns about Z.'s well-being, he was detained and placed in foster care.

A petition was filed in February 2005, alleging that Z. was endangered by: domestic violence between his parents; Mother's and Father's history of substance abuse; Mother's history of mental and emotional problems; and the protracted custody and visitation dispute between his parents. The court found a prima facie case for detaining Z. The court ordered reunification services. Z. was detained in shelter care, and was ordered to receive counseling. Mother and Father were admonished not to make any negative comments or remarks about each other in Z.'s presence. Mother and Father denied the allegations in the petition.

DCFS submitted a report in advance of the jurisdiction hearing. During her interview with the DCFS caseworker, Mother was unable to remain focused, and kept referring to matters in the family law court. She denied a history of substance abuse, but indicated that she suffers from panic attacks, depression, and posttraumatic stress syndrome. Z. stated that he has never seen Mother use drugs, and that she drinks in moderation. Mother and Z. both stated that Father drinks to excess, which Father denies. Z. indicated that he has, in the past, felt physically threatened by Father and had thoughts of hurting Father. Now, Father is more involved in Z.'s life. Mother and Z. are very bonded.

Father characterized Mother as being unstable, and Mother accused Father of brandishing a weapon at her. Father is a sheriff's deputy. In June 2004, Mother was living in a motel with Z., but was evicted because of crowded living conditions. Father picked Z. up for a visit, then filed for custody because Mother had no place to live. Mother has been moving from place to place, including a domestic violence shelter and a sober living home. She refused to inform DCFS of her current residence.

Z. informed the caseworker that he did not want to live with Mother or Father; Z. was comfortable in the foster home and wished to stay there. Z. said that he felt depressed. He holds his head down and has difficulty looking at others. He rarely laughs. Mother did not like that Z. is attending counseling with someone that she did not pick. Z. reported that he likes his therapist and feels he could benefit from counseling. Mother was trying to sabotage the counseling by insisting that the therapist was unqualified. Mother was also sabotaging the foster placement by referring to the foster family as “Crackers” and making other derogatory comments about them to Z. She stated that a “gun should be put to the foster mother’s head” and tried to undermine Z.’s positive opinion about the foster family, until the caseworker intervened and told her to stop. Because of Mother’s threats and obnoxious comments, she was no longer welcome to visit Z. at the foster care agency.

Father’s monitored visits with Z. were going well. Father acted appropriately, and his interaction with Z. was warm and friendly. They were planning a vacation together. Z. was opening up with his Father, and they spent much time talking together. Z. told the caseworker that he likes seeing Father. In the next breath, Z. said that he hated Father and is only visiting with Father because he has to. The caseworker pointed out to Z. that his actions did not match his words.

Mother’s monitored visits did not go well. She persisted in discussing the dependency case and the foster home with Z., despite numerous admonitions from the monitor. Mother was reminded that Z. is represented by an attorney and can bring any problems he has to the attention of the social workers. Mother tried to pop Z.’s pimples in front of everyone during one visit, and embarrassed the boy by saying loudly that he has “hideous farts.” Mother made threats against the foster family and one of her visits was terminated. She showed up at Z.’s school and demanded to talk to him.

The caseworker concluded that Mother and Father “have placed their son in the middle of Family Law matters causing him extreme emotional distress and confusion. In addition, [M]other has grossly acted inappropriately influencing her son[’s] thoughts and

behaviors regarding his father.” DCFS felt that Z. would not be safe in Mother’s care. Further, Mother was jeopardizing Z.’s placement in foster care.

The court ordered two psychological evaluations of the family. One evaluation was performed by psychologist Nancy Kaser-Boyd, who conducted interviews and psychological testing. She described Z., then age 12, as “extremely intelligent, with an excellent vocabulary.” Z. understood that the purpose of the proceeding was to set “boundaries between my two parents and to not have to do the custody thing over and over again.” He feels respected by both of his parents, but indicated that Father could be more involved in his life. He is very loyal to Mother. Kaser-Boyd observed a “camaraderie” between Z. and Father. Z. was under considerable stress as a result of the parental conflict.

Kaser-Boyd interviewed Mother for seven hours, an unusually lengthy period of time. Mother was emotional, “extraordinarily scattered,” and there were “considerable inconsistencies” in her statements. Mother’s parents were physically abusive to her; her mother was bipolar; and her father died of alcoholism. Mother described herself as a little bit manic. Mother stated that Father has pulled a gun and used a carotid chokehold on her. He has threatened to kill her. Mother became intensely angry when Kaser-Boyd urged her to start therapy; Mother appears to be avoiding therapy and cannot admit that she has difficulty controlling her emotions. Mother has “Histrionic Personality Disorder,” according to her psychological tests.

Kaser-Boyd spent several hours interviewing Father, whom she found to be above average in intelligence and pleasant, though somewhat “constricted.” Father described violent outbursts by Mother that made him decide not to live with her. He is relieved that the matter is in dependency court because it means that he can receive regular visitation. He criticized Mother for refusing to work and “milk[ing] the system with disability” claims. Father believes Z. has been brainwashed and that the child worries constantly about Mother’s instability. Father felt able to focus on Z.’s needs. He would like to have custody of Z., but is concerned that Mother would make continuing false accusations

against him. Father's psychological tests were near normal; he was not defensive and there are no hidden pathologies.

Kaser-Boyd concluded that Z. feels overwhelmed and somewhat hopeless because he has divided loyalties and is caught in the middle of an intense, unsolvable conflict. He would like to have a relationship with Father, but is afraid that it would be perceived as a betrayal of Mother. Mother does not understand that her enmeshment with Z. is unhealthy, or that it is important for Z. to have a relationship with Father as Z. approaches manhood. Kaser-Boyd hesitated to term Mother's accusations as malicious, believing instead that "they stem from her extremely overwhelming anxiety and her difficulty modulating emotion." Mother is particularly unreasonable and fearful when her relationship with Z. is threatened. She would benefit from therapy to understand enmeshment and develop emotional control. Kaser-Boyd felt that Father could provide a more stable home; however, because there is a risk that Mother would try to sabotage a placement with Father, Mother's visits should be monitored.

A 59-page psychological evaluation was submitted by Lynda Doi Fick, who reviewed voluminous family law and police records, and interviewed the family. Father and Mother had an on-and-off dating relationship when Mother became pregnant with Z. Father sought to keep regular contact with Z., but Mother falsely claimed to be living in Northern California. In 1996, Father learned that Mother was living in squalid conditions in Canyon Country, and Z. was detained and temporarily placed in Father's care. Custody disputes ensued over the following years. During his evaluation, Z. appeared to be depressed and described himself as feeling "isolated." Z. professed to getting along with both parents and being mystified by their conflict over him. During her evaluation, Mother was crying and at times, incoherent, while recounting her relationship with Father and the conflict over Z.

Doi Fick opined that Z.'s interactions with Father "appear appropriate and rewarding," Mother was observed to be unstable and to lash out angrily at anyone she perceives as threatening, including DCFS workers. Mother lacks sufficient insight to understand that demeaning Father compromises Z.'s self-image and identity. She is

unlikely to accept any intervention that separates her from Z., and “will exercise continued maladaptive coping skills in an attempt to remedy the situation.”

Doi Fick concluded that Z. was unlikely to be physically abused by either parent; however, Z. “may be emotionally at risk without therapeutic services and continued jurisdiction.” Also, there is a risk of abduction. Mother has difficulty shielding Z. from parental conflict, and Z. had to place limits on Mother’s negative comments by redirecting the conversation or telling her to “cut it out.” Doi Fick emphasized that Mother needed to be firmly instructed not to discuss court proceedings or express negative sentiments about Father and Father’s family to Z.

The petition was adjudicated in July 2005. At the outset, all but one of the charges were dismissed in the interest of justice, leaving only the allegation that Z. is the victim of a protracted custody and visitation dispute that causes him to feel overwhelmed, angry and hopeless. Further, Z. is at risk of emotional harm because his parents cannot have direct dealings with regard to custody and visitation.

The court considered all of the documentary evidence, including the two psychological evaluations. All of the parties submitted without argument. The court sustained the allegation, and released Z. to Father’s custody.

A contested disposition hearing began in September 2005, and was not concluded until December 2005. Z. testified and expressed a desire to live with Mother, explaining that “I’ve always lived with her. . . . I don’t see why it would have to change.” She respects and values his opinions and listens to him. The custody dispute was stressful for Z. and interfered with his concentration and schoolwork. Now, however, his relationship with Father has improved, and Z. does not feel anger toward Father. His relationship with Mother has also improved “because the custody dispute isn’t going on anymore.” By this, he means that there is no contact between Mother and Father and no family law court battles. Z. observed that if he were removed from the dependency system, his parents “would probably continue the custody dispute, and I would continue to be stressed.”

A DCFS investigator testified that Mother constantly raises the dependency proceedings when she sees Z. Mother tries to discuss the court case with the child during therapy sessions, and during monitored visitation. She was continuously reprimanded for doing this, and even had her visits terminated because of it. Moreover, she speaks negatively about Father when she sees Z., in violation of court orders. Mother's inability to refrain from discussing the case has impeded Z.'s progress in therapy. Mother told a doctor that she intended to kill Father; the doctor considered the threat to be viable and communicated it to DCFS. Mother's visits were interrupted while DCFS assessed the safety of its monitors, because Mother had previously threatened a DCFS social worker.

Psychologist Kaser-Boyd testified that Mother poses a danger to Z. if she were to have custody because she involves him unnecessarily in family conflict. There was no similar danger posed by Father. Mother has "toxic attitudes" about Father and needs to learn how to control her negativity through classes or in individual therapy. Father does not hold similarly toxic attitudes toward Mother. Kaser-Boyd was "absolutely adamant" that Mother acknowledge her role in the domestic conflict. At this point, Mother poses a psychological and developmental risk to Z. By contrast, Kaser-Boyd saw no risk to Z. if he stays with Father. Z. indicated that he was fine at Father's home. The caseworker observed that Z. was relaxed and comfortable at Father's home, joking and laughing, whereas usually he was quiet and shy. Z. enjoyed his visits with Mother.

Mother testified at the disposition hearing, by telephone. Her answers were long and incoherent, although she did concede that she had access to a shotgun. She yelled and used profanity during her testimony. She blamed everyone else--Father, DCFS, the police--for her problems. She refused to answer whether she thought the best way to resolve the custody conflict was to flee to Canada, an idea she had previously expressed.

Z.'s attorney acknowledged Z.'s wish to return to Mother's custody; however, the lawyer did not advocate for this. Rather, she asked that the dependency court retain jurisdiction to protect Z. from the family court battles and to ensure that Z. receives therapy.

The court declared Z. a dependent of the court, and placed him in Father's custody. Mother was granted reunification services and monitored visitation, but the court expressly found that Mother has made no progress toward alleviating the problems leading to court intervention. In fact, the court described Mother as "toxic," "warped," "self-absorbed," "angry," "dangerous," and unable to cooperate with anyone. The court believes that Mother poses a risk of physical, emotional and sexual harm to Z. All three family members were ordered to participate in counseling, and Mother was to undergo a psychiatric assessment.

Mother appealed from the dispositional order, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the court's jurisdictional findings. In the prior appeal, case No. B188930, we concluded that substantial evidence supported the court's jurisdictional findings and affirmed the judgment.

This concludes our recitation of facts from case No. B188930. We now turn to events that have occurred since Mother appealed from the dispositional order.

In March 2006, DCFS conducted a status review. It reported that Z. "is doing well in school" while living with Father. Mother, Father and Z. were in therapy. Mother had four hours per month of face-to-face visitation with Z. following their conjoint therapy sessions, plus a minimum of two weekly monitored telephone visits. Z.'s therapist, Dr. Kennedy, opined that Father and Z. have "an evolving relationship [that] has appeared to become closer." Mother continued to be very involved in Z.'s care and openly expressed hostility toward Father, which Dr. Kennedy characterized as "overly dramatic dynamics." Mother's efforts to obtain a psychiatric evaluation were unsuccessful. Z. remained in a parentified role with Mother, and Dr. Kennedy believed that Mother's visits should be monitored.

DCFS reported that Mother was participating in individual therapy and living in a suitable home. Mother's therapist opined that Mother was making progress, that she posed no danger and should be given unmonitored visits. At Christmas, Mother had the police accompany her to Father's house so that she could give Z. a gift. Mother expressed fear that Father endangered her and Z. Mother, Father and Z. all wished to

have DCFS continue to intervene and monitor the family's progress. Z. asked to be returned to Mother's care but said that there were no problems residing with Father. The caseworker opined that progress was being made, and that closing the case would cause the family situation to become acrimonious again.

In May and June 2006, Dr. Kennedy reported that things were "more stable in the current familial arrangement," with Z. in Father's custody. Mother continued to express anger toward Father, fueling "free floating angry feelings" in Z. toward Father. Z. was clear with Mother that he does not want to hear her criticize Father. During a co-parenting meeting with the social worker and Dr. Kennedy, Mother informed Father "in a defensive tone" that she had purchased a gun and was no longer in psychotherapy. At that point, Dr. Kennedy opined that he could not support unmonitored visitation unless Mother was under treatment by a mental health professional.

A contested review hearing was conducted intermittently between June and September 2006. The DCFS social worker testified that Mother has been provided with "transportation assistance, case management services, [and] facilitation of visitation." Mother was given referrals to local low-cost counselors and received a detailed case plan from DCFS. She had participated in therapy; obtained stable housing; and completed a parenting program. Her visits were normal and appropriate. There is a strong bond between Z. and Mother. The DCFS social worker personally transported Mother and Z. to their therapy sessions.

Mother has difficulty staying with her therapists because she cannot afford treatment. Though Mother wanted DCFS to pay for her counseling, the social worker testified that "it's not normal practice" for DCFS to pay for a parent's therapy sessions, when therapy is ongoing. The social worker opined that Mother should be given additional family reunification services, but that Z. should not be returned to Mother's

care. DCFS had no concerns regarding Z.'s safety in Father's home.¹ The primary problem, in the view of the social worker, was parental animosity and lack of communication, which placed Z. in a difficult spot.

Mother called 13-year-old Z. to testify at the hearing. He expressed his desire to live with Mother, and stated that he and Mother regularly have monitored telephone conversations. Before DCFS intervened, Z. missed school frequently while attending family law hearings. Z. was not confident that the issues leading to DCFS intervention have been resolved. He expressed concern that the parental custody dispute would be revived if dependency jurisdiction terminated. The family's problems--lack of parental communication and disputes during custody exchanges--were not resolved. Z. does not want the dependency case to be closed because he would be stressed if the problems encountered in family law court recurred.

Z. testified that he never had any problems living with Mother, who provided adequately for him and gave him "a fairly good life." He feels safe with Mother and does not see any need for a monitor. He believes that Mother is not making much progress in conjoint therapy because when Z. and the therapist attempt to address an issue, Mother becomes emotional about it and the session breaks down. By contrast, Z. feels that he and Father have made progress in conjoint therapy. At the completion of Z.'s testimony, Mother stated, "Since my rights are effectively terminated, I would just prefer that this case is closed."

Mother gave a statement in lieu of testimony, because she fired her attorney during the hearing and was acting in propria persona. She felt that DCFS was obliged to pay for her individual counseling and a mental health evaluation, because she has health issues,

¹ Despite the social worker's close monitoring of the family, Mother made numerous referrals of child neglect to the children's services agency in Ventura County. A Ventura social worker actually showed up at the courthouse in Los Angeles during the dependency review hearing to investigate one of Mother's claims. Mother's claims of neglect were unsubstantiated.

lives on Social Security income, and did not wish “to liquidate my stock portfolio” to pay for counseling. She maintained that there were ongoing problems with visitation because Father carries a gun and threatens her.

In closing argument on September 8, 2006, DCFS asked the court to continue reunification services for six more months, reasoning that continued dependency jurisdiction was in Z.’s best interests; otherwise, Z. will find himself amid a custody dispute in family law court. Z.’s attorney also asked the court to keep the case open. Mother argued in favor of terminating jurisdiction and returning the case to family law court, so that “I will get custody of my kid back” In arguing against continued reunification services and dependency jurisdiction, Mother maintained that “there’s no amount of therapy that will make me not have a toxic attitude for [Z.’s] Father.” Father’s attorney concurred with Mother and argued against continued dependency jurisdiction because Mother has not improved at all; therefore, there is no likelihood that she can reunify with Z.

The court found that Z. cannot be returned to Mother’s care: it would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety and well-being. Mother has made “no progress” in resolving the issues that brought her before the court. She continued to make unfounded allegations against Father that Z. is endangered. The court found that DCFS “has bent over backward” to accommodate Mother’s demand for services. But “the reality is she has no insight, understanding, or desire to change any of her behaviors” Mother’s failure to make substantive progress is prima facie evidence that returning Z. to her care would be detrimental. The court noted that the DCFS social worker drove Mother and Z. “hundreds of miles” for visitation and therapy, and was constantly on the telephone arranging and facilitating visitation.

The court determined that Z. is in a safe and stable placement with Father. While it is regrettable that Z. will have to cope with Mother in family law court, the court concluded that he is not at risk and there is no reason to continue dependency jurisdiction. The court terminated its jurisdiction with a family law order giving Father full physical

and legal custody. Mother was given monitored visitation every other Monday, at her own expense.

DISCUSSION

1. Appeal and Review

Once the court adjudicates the dependency petition, its dispositional order constitutes an appealable judgment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395; *In re Sheila B.* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 196.)² Subsequent, postjudgment orders, including an order terminating dependency jurisdiction, are appealable. (§ 395.) Similarly, challenges to the sufficiency of reunification services are cognizable on appeal. (*In re Kristin W.* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 248.) We review the court's orders to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. (*Elijah R. v. Superior Court* (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969; *In re Sarah M.* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1495 (disapproved on other grounds in *In re Chantal S.* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204).)

2. Provision of Reunification Services

The services offered after a child is removed from parental custody are aimed at reunifying the family, and the reunification plan must be appropriate to the family's unique circumstances. (*In re Kristin W.*, *supra*, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 254.) In reviewing the reasonableness of the reunification services provided by DCFS, we "recognize that in most cases more services might have been provided, and the services which are provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances." (*Elijah R. v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 969.)

The evidence supports a finding that reasonable reunification services were offered to Mother. Mother had regular, monitored visitation with Z., both in person and by telephone. She participated in conjoint therapy with Z. She was referred to and

² All further statutory references in this opinion are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

attended individual therapy. She attended a parenting class. The DCFS social worker personally transported Mother and Z. hundreds of miles to their therapy and visitation appointments. The social worker also monitored numerous telephone calls between Mother and Z. each week. The services that the social worker provided were, as Mother concedes, “extraordinary.”

Mother’s only complaint is that DCFS failed to pay for her individual therapy and for a psychiatric evaluation. Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that DCFS has a duty to pay for counseling. On the contrary, the social worker testified that it was *not* normal practice for DCFS to pay for ongoing therapy, and, in her six years of experience, none of the people in her caseload had ever had their counseling paid for. Dr. Kaser-Boyd had observed that Mother became intensely angry when urged to start therapy, and that she was avoiding therapy. The court could reasonably conclude Mother’s claims were merely a ruse, inasmuch as Mother could have used a portion of her stock portfolio to pay for low-cost counseling and a mental health evaluation, if she was serious about reunification.

3. Termination of Dependency Jurisdiction

Mother argues that the court erred by terminating dependency jurisdiction.³ If this was error, Mother invited the error by twice asking the court during the review hearing to terminate its jurisdiction and send the matter back to family law court. “[A] party may not be heard to complain on appeal of a finding that he requested.” (*Blue Cross of Northern California v. Cory* (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 723, 733.) When a party demands something of the court, and the court grants that demand, the party is estopped from asserting on appeal that the court erred in granting his demand. (See *Huffman v. Interstate Brands Corp.* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 706 [the invited error doctrine is based on estoppel].) Mother received exactly what she and Father asked for at the hearing: termination of dependency jurisdiction.

³ DCFS takes no position on this issue.

Even if Mother were not estopped from arguing that the court erred by granting her request to terminate jurisdiction, we would still find that the termination order is supported by substantial evidence. Despite Mother's contention that continuing dependency supervision is necessary, the evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that termination is appropriate. The court was entitled to place Z. with Father as his legal and physical custodian.

At the disposition hearing in December 2005, the court found that Mother had made no progress toward alleviating the problems that led to dependency jurisdiction. Nine months later, at the status review hearing, the court again found that Mother had made no progress in addressing her problems. There is no reason to believe--after a year and a half of dependency intervention--that six more months of services would rectify the circumstances that gave rise to this proceeding.

Mother is patently unwilling to address her problems, and continues to blame everyone else for them. Z. testified that Mother made little progress in conjoint therapy because she would flare up when Z. tried to address important issues. Mother's statements during the status review hearing were replete with self-pity and anger, with particular venom aimed at the judge. There was no indication that Mother accepted responsibility and was willing to move forward. In fact, the opposite is true: Mother announced during the review hearing that "no amount of therapy" would alter her "toxic attitude."

Given Mother's professed resistance to overcoming the very problem that landed her in dependency court, there was no reason for the court to drag the case on for six more months of therapy for Mother. The experts--Dr. Kaser Boyd and Dr. Kennedy--agreed that Z. is safe in Father's custody. Z. has stated that he is fine with Father, even though he would prefer to live with Mother. If a child is no longer at risk, termination of jurisdiction is appropriate even if the parents have poor communication skills, because

the family law court is able to handle issues relating to visitation. (*In re Sarah M, supra*, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1500.)⁴

4. Visitation Order

Mother challenges the reasonableness of the dependency court's visitation order, which allows her to have monitored visits with Z. every other Monday. She believes that visitation should be unmonitored. The court is entitled to enter a visitation order when it terminates jurisdiction. (§ 362.4.)

The court did not abuse its discretion by ordering monitored visitation. Mother failed to convince the court to authorize unmonitored visitation during the entire year and a half duration of the dependency proceeding, and it is easy to see why. In 2005, Mother communicated to a doctor a threat to kill Father. The doctor disclosed it to DCFS because he felt that it was a credible threat. In June 2006, Dr. Kennedy wrote that during a co-parenting meeting with Father, Mother stated in an aggressive tone that she had purchased a gun, and had stopped psychotherapy. Dr. Kennedy promptly rescinded any prior notion about unmonitored visitation. He expressed concern for Mother's ability to provide a safe environment for Z. during transfers with Father, and indicated that "[t]hese events do not help me justify supporting unmonitored visitation. . . . Without another mental health professional responsible for her care, I am unable to support her unmonitored visits at this time."

Dr. Kennedy's assessment justified the court's imposition of a monitoring requirement. Throughout this case, Mother has made violent threats and boasted of possessing guns. She said that a gun should be put to the head of Z.'s foster mother, while he was in foster care. She threatened to kill Father. She threatened a DCFS social

⁴ It is unfortunate that Z.--an intelligent and mature teenager--may suffer the consequences of Mother's renewed attacks on Father in family law court. With any luck, the family law judge will take the matter firmly in hand and not allow Z.'s life and schooling to be disrupted by Mother's antics.

worker. She lashes out at anyone involved in this case. Psychological evaluator Doi Fick felt that Mother might abduct Z. During the disposition hearing, Mother yelled and cursed, and said she had access to a shotgun. Given Mother's apparent mental instability, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that Mother's visits be monitored.

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order under review) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

BOREN, P.J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.